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I. Introduction
One of the most important functions of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is the administration of
labeling requirements promulgated pursuant to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).1 This
function is especially important in the area of medical devices. Although consumers may use such devices
on a routine basis, most lack both the scientic knowledge to adequately inform themselves of the risks of
device usage and the resources to keep abreast of developments in the device eld. But protecting consumers
involves more than merely informing them of risks. The FDA has also sought to restrain its regulatory power
in this area in order to provide device manufacturers with the exibility needed to innovate and to ensure
widespread device distribution.2 Any FDA decision in the device labeling context, therefore, inevitably
involves the weighing of these two often contradictory goals.
The FDA has recently brought this weighing test to bear on the issue of new labeling practices adopted
by certain members of the context lens manufacturing industry. These practices essentially involve special-
ized brand naming, under which identical varieties of contact lenses and lens solutions are labeled as use
specic products. Although these practices have led to consumer complaints { most notably regarding the
dierential pricing of identical products { the FDA has refused to take action. Unfortunately, the agency's
decision is based on two incorrect premises. The rst of these is that the issue is merely one of pricing, and
is therefore more appropriately addressed by consumer protection institutions other than the FDA. This
B.A., Georgetown University; J.D. candidate, 1996, Harvard Law School.
1See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. xx 343 (misbranding of food), 352 (misbranding of drugs and devices),
and 362 (misbranding of cosmetics) (1988).
2See Peter Barton Hutt, A History of Government Regulation of Adulteration and Misbranding of Medical Devices, 44
FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 99, 117 (1989). (\Congress sought to balance the need to protect the public from adulteration and
misbranding of medical devices against the need to foster the development of innovative new lifesaving medical devices. The
FDA, in turn, has sought to achieve the same balance.")
1assertion is refuted by current interpretations of the FDCA { a statute that the FDA is charged to enforce
{ which clearly identify the disputed labeling practices as misbranding. The second is that these practices
are merely an additional means of preventing the misuse of lenses and lens solutions, and therefore increase
consumer safety. This assertion is refuted by the current literature on the hazards of overwarning, which
suggests that such practices actually increase the risk to public health.
II. The Contact Lens Controversy
The labeling practices of contact lens manufacturers have recently come under the scrutiny of journalists
and consumer advocates, with the practices of optometrical giant Bausch & Lomb causing the most concern.
The company currently manufacturers a lens which accommodates a variety of wearer needs. The versatility
of this product, however, is masked by the fact that Bausch & Lomb labels the identical lens as four distinct
and dierent products. Although the constituent materials and production process for the lenses are the
same, each product bears its own brand name, separate wearing instructions, and an individualized price.3
It is this nal factor { dierential pricing for identical products { which has raised the ire of consumer
advocates. The price dierentials for Bausch & Lomb's contact lenses are signicant. The least expensive
brand, Occasions, cost about $3 a pair, and contain instructions recommending that they be used for only
a single day, while the most expensive brand, Optima F.W., cost about $70 a pair, and contain instructions
stating that they may be used for a year or more.4 Two intermediate brands { Medalist, which cost $15 a
pair and are marketed as requiring monthly replacement, and SeeQuence 2, which cost $8 a pair and are
marketed as requiring weekly replacement { ll out the product line-up with smaller, but no less merited,
3Contact-lens Prices Change in the Blink of an Eye, CONSUMER REPORTS, Aug. 1994, at 490.
4Jane Bennett Clark and Christopher Phillips, Bausch & Lomb: Pulling the Wool Over Its Customers Eyes? KIPLINGER'S
PERSONAL FINANCE MAGAZINE. Mar. 1994, at 152.
2price dierentials.5
In response to complaints, Bausch & Lomb has put forth two separate justications for its labeling prac-
tices. The rst is that it is simply providing its customers with a volume discount.6 Consumers whose
doctors recommend that they replace their contact lenses more frequently, for whatever reason, constitute
an important part of the lens buying market with which Bausch & Lomb wishes to curry favor by providing
special discounts. This justication, however, fails to explain the need for separate brand names. A lens
manufacturer could just as easily provide volume discounts by oering dierent numbers of lenses at dierent
prices, with full disclosure that all lenses are identical. The second justication is, ironically, the desire to
prevent confusion which could lead to health problems.7 Bausch & Lomb essentially argues that labeling
the same lens as dierent products reinforces the notion that, even when a large number of people are using
an identical medical device, what constitutes safe usage of the device is still very much an individualized
determination. Although a daily wear lens may be exactly the same as an extended wear lens, an individual
could suer signicant harm by using the lens in one manner instead of the other. Labeling the lens with
a brand name intended only for daily wear or only for extended wear, Bausch & Lomb argues, limits the
confusion or misuse which could lead to this type of harm. This explanation, however, fails to account for
the fact that contact lenses are a restricted medical device for which an doctor must provide a prescription.
Thus, any confusion an individual might have regarding the proper usage of contact lenses may be more
appropriately dealt with by his or her doctor or pharmacist. Bausch & Lomb's position is akin to arguing
that manufacturers should be given free reign to market identical prescription medications under as many
dierent brand names and at as many dierent prices as they wish simply because dierent doses may have
dierent eects on individual consumers.
5Id.
6Digest, Wash Post, Nov. 3,1994, at B11.
7Dateline NBC: Optical Illusions? (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 14, 1995) (transcript available from Burrelle's Informa-
tion Services) at 15.
3Bausch & Lomb has extended these questionable labeling practices into other areas as well. Rather than
limiting the practice of marketing identical products under dierent brand names to the contact lenses them-
selves, Bausch & Lomb has also applied this tactic to products for the care of contact lenses. Currently, the
company markets contact rinsing solution at about $0.23 an ounce.8 This solution is intended for use in both
cleaning the lens after removal from the eye and in storing the lens overnight or for other extended periods.
It also markets rewetting drops at a cost of $4.49 an ounce.9 These drops are intended for lubrication of the
lens while it remains in the eye. In spite of the fact that one product costs the consumer twenty times as
much as the other, there is no dierence whatsoever. Both the rinsing solution and the rewetting drops are
composed of the same sterile isotonic buered solution.10
Rather than relying on claims of volume discounts or the need to prevent consumer confusion, Bausch &
Lomb justies the labeling of its contact lens solutions as based on safety requirements imposed by the
FDA. Because the FDA wishes to prevent potential injuries resulting from consumer attempts to squirt lens
solution directly into the eye using the larger bottle in which rinsing solution is packaged, it requires the eye
dropper bottle packaging used for rewetting drops.11 Bausch & Lomb thus contends that it is this mandatory
packaging which accounts for the price dierential between the two identical products. Once again, however,
this justication fails to explain the need for separate brand names. With disclosure of the fact that the
two products were, in fact, identical, consumers would be able to make more cost eective decisions without
any increase in the risk to their safety. Armed with the knowledge that the eye dropper packaging accounts
for much of the product's cost, for example, consumers could purchase the product in this form only once,
thereafter purchasing lens solution in the less expensive packaging and relling the eye dropper container for
8Id. at 17.
9Id.
10Id.
11Id. (The FDA contends that the eye dropper bottle provides a more sanitary method of delivering lens solution directly
into the eye.)
4reuse.12
Although examination of the ingredients printed on the product's label reveals that both the dierent brands
of lenses and the dierent brands of lens solution are identical, this has not served to limit consumer confu-
sion. In the case of lenses for example, 65% of lens wearers continue to purchase the most expensive variety;
those labeled as requiring replacement only after a year or more of use.13 Market forces have also failed to
remedy the problem. In spite of the fact that contact lens sales generate $150 million per year in revenue for
Bausch & Lomb, competitors have not come forward to expose the company's labeling practices.14 Doctors
have also been slow to alert patients to the fact that these dierently packaged labels are identical, perhaps
due to confusion within their own ranks. Although examination of the lenses would reveal to any optometrist
that the lenses are identical, they seldom have cause to conduct such an examination. Thus, the current
inquiry into the matter did not begin until a single optometrist became curious about the fact that Bausch
& Lomb used the same pair of trial lenses to t patients for two ostensibly distinct products.15
In spite of the concerns raised above, the FDA initially approved Bausch & Lomb's labeling scheme, and has
yet to voice any concern or reservation regarding this approval.16 The certainty of FDA ocials, however,
is not shared by ocials elsewhere in the government. In April of 1993, the District Attorney's Oce for
Ventura County, California submitted a letter to the FDA requesting that the agency reconsider its approval
of the labeling scheme. In response, however, the FDA not only refused to take action, but stated that Ven-
tura County would be exceeding its jurisdiction if it attempted to take independent action against Bausch
12While it could be argued that the relling and reuse of the eye dropper container could increase the chance of the lens
solution becoming contaminated, and the corresponding chance that these contaminants would be introduced into the eye, the
risk is no greater than other risks of contamination to which the contact lens user is routinely subjected. The risk is akin to that
presented by relling and reusing a lens storage or cleaning apparatus, or by simply leaving a lens solution container uncapped.
13Clark and Phillips, supra note 2, at 152.
14Kenneth N. Gilpin, Suit Against Bausch & Lomb Is Judged a Class Action, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1994, at D5.
15Contact-lens Prices Change in the Blink of an Eye, supra note 1, at 490 (Dr. Robert Pazen, a California optometrist, rst
brought the contact lens labeling issue to the attention of the Ventura County District Attorney's Oce).
16Constance Sommer, D.A. Questions FDA Approval of Lens Labels; Consumer: Bausch & Lomb Is Accused of Marketing
the Same Product Under Three Dierent Brand Names and Prices, L.A. Times, Sept. 4, 1993, at B1.
5& Lomb.17 The FDA reasoned that as long as the lenses were eective for their intended purpose, there was
no reason to deny approval of their labeling, and that disputes involving manufacturer pricing were not an
appropriate area for FDA involvement.18 Undeterred by the FDA's response, opponents of these labeling
practices have continued to take various other forms of action against Bausch & Lomb, including litigation
in federal court based on claims of consumer fraud.19
III. Contact Lens Labeling as Misbranding
The FDA's assertion that the contact lens labeling practices in dispute merely constitute a pricing issue
which is outside the agency's area of concern clearly conicts with both past agency action and the provi-
sions of the FDCA which the FDA is charged to enforce. There are two principle provisions of the FDCA
which are pertinent to the contact lens labeling issue. The rst deals exclusively with the misbranding of
drugs and medical devices, and states that such a product shall be deemed misbranded if its labeling is
\false or misleading in any particular."20 This provision is further rened by the second; a list of factors
for the decisionmaker to consider when evaluating whether a particular label is \misleading."21 This second
provision applies to all labels, whether axed to food, drugs, cosmetics, or medical devices, and states that
not only should \representations made or suggested by a statement" on a label be taken into account, but
\the extent to which the labeling... fails to reveal facts material in light of such representations" as well.22
17Id.
18Contact-lens Prices Change in the Blink of an Eye, supra note 1, at 490.
19See Digest, supra note 4, at B11 (suit led against Bausch & Lomb regarding contact lens pricing practices and alleging
fraudulent marketing); Gilpin, supra note 12, at D5 (Judge U.W. Clemon of the United States District Court in Birmingham,
Alabama allows lawsuit against Bausch & Lomb by three consumers to proceed as a class action).
20Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. x 352(a) (1988). The FDCA also describes a number of specic actions
which will constitute misbranding in the drug and device context, including the failure to include a label bearing the name
and place of business of the manufacturer, an accurate statement of the quantity of contents, or adequate directions for the
product's use. See id. at x 352(a)-(t).
21Id. at x 321(n).
22Id.
6Due to the long history of manufacturer misbranding of medical devices both in Europe and the United
States,23 both of these provisions, or their precursors in prior incarnations of the FDCA, have been the sub-
ject of important judicial opinions. Thus, while the FDA often enforces the FDCA's misbranding provisions
through more informal, and less well publicized, action today, judicial precedent exists by which to measure
the agency's consistency in this area.
1. Standard of Consumer Knowledge
In order to evaluate whether the misbranding of a product has misled a consumer, it is rst necessary to
establish some baseline standard for consumer intelligence. This is especially dicult in the eld of drugs and
medical devices, due to the vast dierences in medical knowledge throughout the American public. Both a
small child and a Nobel laureate are equally likely to require the use of crutches. The courts have not arrived
at a single standard, but have espoused a number of more and less forgiving positions. Among the most
forgiving is that espoused in United States v. Vitamin Industries, Inc.24 In that case, which involved false
claims by a vitamin manufacturer that its product would restore lost vitality and combat a lack of vigor and
energy.25 The court stated that although the standard is \the average person," special allowance must be
made for \susceptible groups" to whom such claims are particularly aimed.26 The specic susceptible group
at issue was the elderly, to whom the product's claims of renewed vigor were directed.27 On the less forgiving
23See Hutt, supra note 2, at 99. There is evidence of the misbranding of medical devices in England as far back as 1745,
at which time a \celestial bed" connected to electric coils was marketed as a cure for sterility. The earliest example of such
activity in the U.S. occurred in the late 1700s when three inch rods of brass and iron were promoted as eliminating disease from
the body. Id. at 99-100.
24See 130 F. Supp. 755 (D. Neb. 1955). See also United States v. Article of Drug, 263 F. Supp. 212 (D. Neb. 1967)
(espousing special allowance for susceptible groups).
25See id. at 760.
26See id. at 767.
27See id. (In the case of the elderly, the court noted, the products claims constituted a \message that they are longing to
hear; and with pathetic eagerness they receive and embrace it. They are especially to be regarded in these circumstances, for
it is to them and their faltering faculties, physical and mental, that the message of the labeling is oriented.").
7end of the spectrum, the court in United States v. Pinaud, Inc. held the standard to be \purchasers... of
normal capacity."28 Most other courts have taken a middle course between these two positions, but, while
the concern of the Vitamin Industries' court for susceptible groups has not gained general acceptance, its
more forgiving approach has generally prevailed.29 For better or for worse, the courts have interpreted the
FDCA as legislation designed to protect a group of very gullible consumers.
Attempting to apply these various standards is not made a great deal easier by the knowledge that the con-
sumer group in question is composed of contact lens wearers. It is dicult, though not impossible, to argue
that contact lens wearers constitute a \susceptible group" under Vitamin Industries. On average, contact
lens wearers, unlike the elderly, are no more likely to suer from the type of reduced physical and mental
capacity that would impede their ability to evaluate claims on product labels than the general population.
Similarly, their aiction { impaired vision { is unlikely to produce the type of judgment clouding despera-
tion that frequently aicts other susceptible groups, such as the overweight. While it could be argued that
lens wearers are a vain and self conscious lot, as demonstrated by their choice of expensive and potentially
dangerous contact lenses over inexpensive and potentially unfashionable eye glasses, this provides a rather
weak basis for classication as \susceptible." Any susceptibility due to vanity is also oset by the fact that
contact lenses are considered luxury cosmetic items under many health plans, making the typical lens wearer
a person of higher socio-economic status and correspondingly greater consumer savvy. Thus, the typical lens
wearer seems more appropriately governed by the \purchaser... of normal capacity" standard of Pinaud.
Yet even under this less forgiving standard, the question remains: would a consumer of \normal capacity"
expect a company to market an identical product under four dierent brand names with four dierent sets
281938-1949 FDLI Jud. & Admin. Rec. 526, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). See also United States v. 1 Device... Radiant Ozone
Generator, 1949-1950 FDLI Jud. & Admin. Rec. 139, 143 (W.D. Mo. 1949) (standard is the \ordinary person"); United States
v. Vrilium Products, Co., 1949-1950 FDLI Jud. & Admin. Rec. 210,214 (N.D. Ill. 1950) (same).
29See, e.g., United States v. Article Consisting of 216 Cartoned Bottles... \Sudden Change," 409 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1969) (the
standard is \the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous); United States v. 62 Packages... Marmola Prescription Tablets,
48 F. Supp. 878 (W.D. Wis 1943) (the standard is \the vast multitude, which includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the
credulous"); United States v. An Article of Food... \Schmidt's Blue Ribbon," 1969-1974 FDLI Jud. Rec. 139 (D. Md. 1973)
(the standard is \the often unthinking and gullible consumer").
8of instructions at four dierent prices?
Establishing a baseline for consumer intelligence, however, is not the only prerequisite to an eective mis-
branding inquiry. Establishing a baseline level of consumer caution or attentiveness is equally important.
Consumer intelligence merely determines whether an individual will be able to understand and evaluate
the information on a product label. Considering this factor alone, however, presumes that the consumer
was skeptical enough to examine the label in the rst place, which is certainly not always the case. Once
again the courts have failed to reach consensus on a standard, although there is less disagreement than in
the case of consumer intelligence. The least forgiving standard was adopted in United States v. Articles of
Drug, which involved the misbranding of Vit-Ra-Tox; a product labeled as the sole solution to nationwide
nutritional problems impervious to the eects of synthetic vitamins.30 Addressing the issue of consumer
skepticism, the majority stated that, when applying the FDCA, courts should not assume that the public
will exercise \great selectivity and caution in what they choose to believe of what they hear or read."31
Nevertheless, it cautioned, misbranding claims cannot be based on \strained and distorted interpretation[s]
of the text."32 Other courts have adopted slightly more lenient verbal formulas,33 but the overall eect of
their application diers little from the Articles of Drug standard. Just as courts presume that the typical
consumer is extremely gullible, they also presume that he is remarkably oblivious.
Applying these standards to contact lens wearers is a bit easier than applying the standards for consumer
intelligence. The baseline level of the lens wearer's caution or attentiveness is determined primarily by two
things that the typical lens wearer is not. The rst is that he is not a medical professional. As a result, the
lens wearer is unlikely to question scientic claims, such as the wearing instructions for a particular lens,
30See Articles of Drug, 263 F. Supp. at 216. (The product's label consisted of a pamphlet entitled \Your Life." The rst
chapter stated that a great majority of the population was sick. The second chapter described Vit-Ra-Tox as the sole solution.).
31Id.
32Id.
33See, e.g., Vitamin Industries, 130 F. Supp. at 767 (the standard is \people of ordinary... discrimination"); 62 Packages...
Marmola Prescription Tablets, 48 F. Supp. at 878 (the standard is \the credulous who, when making a purchase, do not stop
to analyze").
9or even to ponder them at length. Since contact lenses are available by prescription only, the lens wearers
incentive to question scientic claims is reduced even further. He will leave these concerns to the expertise of
his doctor. The second thing the typical lens wearer is not is a consumer advocate. Thus, it is unlikely that
he will purchase, or even investigate, brands of contact lenses other than the one his doctor recommends.
Both the recommendation of his physician, and the reality of the conditions of the purchase and sale of
prescription drugs and devices{ which involves the storage of products in a controlled area, beyond the reach
of consumer perusal { create an information asymmetry by inhibiting the normal tendency to engage in
comparison shopping. As a result, even under the strictest standards for both consumer intelligence and
caution, it is unrealistic to believe that the typical lens wearer will not be misled by the disputed label-
ing practices. Just as a consumer of \normal capacity" would not necessarily divine that four dierently
branded products from a single manufacturer are identical, a consumer exercising less than \great selectivity
and caution" would almost certainly fail to notice that ingredients listed on the product recommended by
a trusted eye care professional are identical to those listed on a dierently branded product locked safely
behind the pharmacist's counter. The fact that 65% of consumers continue to purchase the most expensive
brand of lens seems to bear this assertion out.34
Even this analysis, however, presents a deceptively strict view of judicial interpretation of the FDCA's mis-
branding provisions. The courts' vision of the typical consumer as an individual of limited knowledge and
limited attentiveness is supplemented by the fact that the FDCA's misbranding provisions may be invoked
even if no consumer has been actually misled. In United States v. Dotterweich, the Supreme Court held that
a contrary interpretation would literally require a re-writing of the FDCA, which dearly identies a \false
or misleading label" as an example of misbranding.35 Requiring both elements for a nding of misbranding,
34See infra note 11 and accompanying text.
35See Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) (The Court held that replacing the \or" in 21 U.S.C. x 352(a) with an \and" would
amount to an unwarranted disregard of the clear meaning of the words.). See also United States v. One Device... the Ellis
Microdynameter, 224 F. Supp. 265 (E.D. Penn. 1962) (rejecting the argument that admittedly false claims regarding the
disease detecting capacity of a string galvanometer did not constitute misbranding because purchaser was not misled by them).
10the Court held, would run counter to the FDCA's goal of consumer protection.36 As a result, even if the
disputed contact lens labeling practices were held to be a clumsy ploy apparent to all consumers, or if lens
wearers in general were held to be an extraordinarily knowledgeable and attentive consumer group, the
misbranding inquiry would not be at an end. The lens manufacturer would still be liable if the claims on
its packaging were held to be false; a standard which itself has been the subject of ample judicial development.
2. Misbranding by Ambiguity and Omission
Rather than requiring direct and intentional falsehoods, the courts have sought to further the FDCA's goal
of consumer protection by adopting a broad reading of the \false and misleading" language of the Act's
misbranding provisions. As experts on the exibility of language, judges were unwilling to permit a level
of technical compliance with the FDCA that would simply aect the form, rather than the existence, of
consumer deception through labeling. The most forceful statement of this position came in the Supreme
Court's opinion in United States v. Ninety-Five Barrels of... Apple Cider Vinegar.37 There the Court held
that, because the term \cider" refers to juice, a product made entirely from dehydrated apples could not be
labeled as \apple cider vinegar."38 Writing for the majority, justice Butler stated:
Deception may result from the use of statements not technically false or which may be literally
true. The aim of the statute is to prevent that resulting from indirection and ambiguity, as well as
from statements which are false. It is not dicult to choose statements, designs and devices which
will not deceive. Those which are ambiguous and liable to mislead should be read favorably to the
accomplishment of the purpose of the act.39
This standard was subsequently modied by two important renements, the rst of which concerned the scope
of the label examination. Instead of focusing on a single statement, courts were admonished to examine the
36See Dotterweich at 277 (the goal of the FDCA is to keep misbranded drugs and devices out of the channels of commerce).
37265 U.S. 438 (1924).
38See id. at 443 (The name \apple cider vinegar" included in the brand did not represent the article to be what it really was;
and, in eect, did represent it to be what it was not, { vinegar made from fresh or unevaporated apples.)
11eect of the label as a whole.40 The second renement specically addressed the category of claim to which
the public is most susceptible: scientic assertions. The courts refused to accept the inherent uncertainties
of research as a defense, and held that scientic half-truths, like half-truths of any other variety, constituted
misbranding under the FDCA.41
In applying the principles established in these cases to the medical device context, the courts have arrived
at a number of decisions that are suggestive of appropriate FDA action regarding the contact lens labeling
controversy. Two such decisions are United States v. Ellis Microdynameter, in which a string galvanometer
was held to be misbranded as a result of exaggerated disease detection claims42, and United States v. One
Device, Intended for Use as a Colonic Irrigator, in which a colonic irrigator was held to be misbranded as
a result of exaggerated disease prevention claims.43 In neither case was the determination of misbranding
premised on the proposition that the device itself was misidentied, nor on the proposition that the device
was entirely useless.44 Rather, after consideration of the label as a whole, the court determined that claims
of specialized functions contributed to an overall impression that was liable to mislead. The disputed contact
lens labeling practices present a parallel situation. Although the device itself is not misidentied { the label
clearly indicates that contact lenses are contained within { and cannot be described as useless { its vision
correcting capacity is not in dispute { it is nevertheless misbranded by claims of a specialized function. Just
as the label of the string galvanometer proclaimed a specialized ability to detect disease, and that of the
40See United States v. Six Dozen Bottles... 'Dr. Peter's Kuriko,' 158 F.2d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 1947) (pamphlet used as
labeling held to constitute misbranding when considered in its entirety, although no statement contained therein was literally
false).
41See, e.g., Research Laboratories v. United States, 167 F.2d 410, 418 (9th Cir. 1947) (\the scientic half-truths in the
labeling alone make out a case of misbranding").
42See Ellis Microdynameter, 224 F. Supp. 265, 267 (E.D. Penn. 1962) (the device's label falsely claimed that it was capable
of detecting a number of serious diseases ranging from acidosis to uremia).
43See Colonic Irrigator, 160 F.2d 194, 199 (10th Cir. 1947) (the device's ambitious label falsely claimed that it was a cure-all
for every ill, whether known or unknown).
44See Ellis Microdynameter, 224 F. Supp. at 266 (the device was useful for measuring the degree of resistance to electrical
current on the skin); Colonic Irrigator, 160 F.2d at 197 (the device was useful for ushing the intestines).
12colonic irrigator proclaimed a specialized ability to prevent disease, the labels of the disputed contact lenses
proclaim a specialized ability to treat specic visual ailments. A lens labeled for extended wear, for example,
purports to be appropriate for a certain set of conditions { dryness of the eye, susceptibility to infection, or
whatever other conditions compel a doctor to recommend one method of lens use as opposed to another {
for which a lens labeled for daily wear is not. The cases are thus distinguishable only on the basis of the
magnitude of danger presented to a consumer who falls victim to the labeling ruse. Postponing trips to
the doctor as a result of reliance on an Ellis Microdynameter is certainly more hazardous than overpaying
for a pair of contact lenses. Magnitude of danger alone, however, is not an eective barometer of FDA
enforcement priorities. Apple Cider Vinegar, after an, merely involved the substitution of dehydrated apples
for the plump, juicy real thing, and thereby demonstrates that cumulative eects and the establishment of
eective precedent are equally important considerations.
The courts have addressed one particular form of misbranding by ambiguity with great specicity: contra-
dictory statements on labels. In order to create the desired impression in consumers, while still remaining
within the letter of the law, manufacturers have sought to mollify the misleading character of certain label
statements through the inclusion of explanations. The courts, however, have rejected this practice as a
permissible interpretation of the FDCA in a number of cases. In H.N. Heusner & Son v. Federal Trade
Commission, for example, a cigar producer labeled a product produced entirely with Pennsylvania tobacco
as Havana Smokers, then attempted to assuage this deception through inclusion of a legend stating that the
cigars were made in the U.S. and only from U.S. tobacco.45 In its determination of misbranding, the court
held that [t]he purchaser can be guided by either label or legend, but not by both.46 These principles have
served to govern both self-contradictory statements included in a label's ne print,47 and those made more
45See Heusner, 106 F.2d 596,597 (3d Cir. 1947).
46Id. See also El Moro Cigar Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 107 F.2d 429,431 (4th Cir. 1945); Progress Tailoring Co. v.
Federal Trade Commission, 153 F.2d 103, 105 (7th Cir. 1943).
47See United States v. Six Dozen Bottles... 'Dr. Peter's Kuriko,' 158 F.2d 667, 669 (7th Cir. 1947) (In holding a pamphlet
used as labeling for a laxative to constitute misbranding, the court stated that this page of the pamphlet alone, considering the
13boldly in disclaimers.48 The size or conspicuousness of the contradictory statements is thus not the primary
issue, but their very presence. The fact that a second statement might undo the deception of the rst is
simply not enough to preserve the label's legality.
Application of these decisions to the contact lens labeling controversy clearly undermines one of the manufac-
turer's principle defenses. While it could be argued that any consumer confusion resulting from the dierent
brand names and directions for use would be countered by the fact that an identical list of ingredients is
printed on each lens label, this amounts to characterizing the list of ingredients as a disclaimer. Such an
argument is little more than Pasadena Research Laboratories v. United States in reverse.49 In that case,
a drug manufacturer argued that a false claim in the st of ingredients was countered by a contradictory
statement elsewhere on the label,50 whereas here a device manufacturer argues that a false claim elsewhere
on the label is countered by a contradictory statement in the list of ingredients. Stare decisis dictates that
the nding of misbranding in the former should govern in the latter. In fact, the argument for misbranding is
even stronger in the contact lens context because, barring an unusual level of medical knowledge on the part
of the consumer, the contradiction between the two statements will become apparent only when two or more
dierent lens labels are compared. Only after comparison of the st of ingredients on, for example, lenses
labeled exclusively for daily wear and lenses labeled exclusively for extended wear will the consumer realize
form of its arrangement, the ailments which are listed in large type and the limitation with reference thereto in small type, in
connection with the pictures of persons evidently in misery and distress, furnishes a basis for a nding that the representations
were misleading.).
48See Pasadena Research Laboratories v. United States, 169 F.2d 375, 383 (9th Cir. 1948) ([T]he purchaser of 'Indoform'
could be guided either by the labeling 'thyroid substance,' which implies the presence of a therapeutic ingredient, or by the
'disclaimer' of the presence of any such ingredient Obviously, the implication of presence and the negation of presence cannot
both be true.)
49See id.
50See id. at 383 (the drug's list of ingredients stated that it contained \thyroid substance" while a contradictory disclaimer
stated that -Ms preparation does not contain any known therapeutically useful constituent"). An even more direct parallel
emerges from the food labeling context in United States v. 432 Cartons... Candy Lollipops, 292 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). There the court held that candy labeled as \Liquor Flavored Lollypops" was misbranded in spite of the fact that the
list of ingredients disclosed that the product contained no liquor. Id. The court went on to state that \even though the actual
ingredients are stated on the outside of a carton, false of misleading statements inside the carton may lead to the conclusion
that the labeling is misleading, since a true statement will not necessarily cure or neutralize a false one contained in the label.
Id. at 841.
14that the lists, and the products, are identical. Presuming that an optometrist will not prescribe both brands
to a single patient, and that the average consumer will hesitate to pester the pharmacist, such comparisons
will take place infrequently, and the conicting claims will remain undiscovered.
The courts have also interpreted the FDCA's misbranding provisions as barring deception through omission.
The text of the Act dearly addresses both armative representations and \the extent to which the label-
ing... fails to reveal facts material in light of such representations.51 In spite of this provision, drug and
device manufacturers have continued their attempts to mislead consumers through omissions, with varying
degrees of success. Once again, however, the case most analogous to the contact lens labeling controversy is
Pasadena Research Laboratories. In addition to labeling its product with self-contradictory statements, the
drug manufacturer in that case failed to disclose the fact that certain ingredients, which were not present,
were necessary to activate those that were.52 This omission created the impression that the drug was es-
pecially suitable for the treatment of certain conditions for which it was not. Similarly, omission of the
fact that both lenses labeled exclusively for daily wear and those labeled exclusively for extended wear are
identical creates the impression that each is especially suitable for treatment of a specic visual ailment.
By attempting to justify these labeling practices as an eort to limit consumer confusion about proper lens
usage, manufacturers conrm that this is the impression they are seeking to create. Thus, by permitting
these practices to continue, the FDA not only fails to uphold the FDCA, but inicts very real costs on
consumers, of which overpayment for contact lenses is just the beginning.
IV. Contact Lens Labeling as Overwarning
51Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. x 321(n) (1988).
52See Pasadena Research Laboratories, 169 F.2d at 383 (label stating that drug contained \thyroid substance" constituted
misbranding because it failed to disclose that without iodine the substance was therapeutically inactive). See also Northern
Trust Company v. Upjohn Company, 572 N.E.2d 1030,1036-37 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (package insert constituted misbranding
because it failed to disclose that cardiac arrest was a possible side eect of pregnancy interruption drug).
15The most serious of the costs inicted on consumers by the FDA's failure to act are those that can be
attributed to the phenomenon of overwarning. While the term \overwarning" generally triggers images of
overly detailed labels and mountains of small print, the practices at issue here are simply another manifesta-
tion of the same problem. Labeling an ordinary contact lens as a lens exclusively for daily wear in order to
prevent the consumer from wearing it in any other manner is, in eect, a warning against improper usage.
Carried into other contexts, this standard might permit, for example, the labeling of ordinary aspirin as
\Meal Time Aspirin" to ensure that consumers take it with food, or \Aspirin 3" to ensure that consumers
take it precisely three times per day. Each product could then, like the disputed contact lenses, be labeled
with distinct directions and sold at independent, and vastly diering, prices.
While it is uncertain whether the FDA has actually endorsed this reasoning, the agency's failure to act could
be construed as a tacit approval of the manufacturer's public adoption of this position. Whether it is the
FDA's ocial reasoning or not, however, the eects on the public from the agency's failure to act will remain
the same. The FDA's failure to recognize, or willingness to permit, these eects suggests that its non-action
is rooted in two incorrect assumptions. The rst of these is that more warning is necessarily good. But due
to the fact that consumers can make use of only a limited amount of information, it is the optimal level of
warning that is desired { that level at which any more or any less information would increase the sum of
accident and avoidance costs { rather than the highest level.53 The second is that warnings are costless.
Although many of the costs of warning are unseen, they are nonetheless signicant, and go far beyond the
cost of additional ink to put a few more words on a label.54
53See W. LANDES AND RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 280-84 (1987) (discussing
optimal warnings in the tort context); A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 25-36 (discussing
optimal warnings in the contracts context).
54See James Henderson, Jr. and Aaron Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to
Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L REV. 265, 297 (1990) (\the greatest part of the costs of overwarning are nonmonetary and easily ignored");
Aaron Twerski et al., The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products liability { Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61
CORNELL L. REV. 495,513 (1976) (\The reason for the trend toward overwarning is clear. Warnings are an apparently
inexpensive mode of dealing with risks.").
161. Impact on Warning Eectiveness
One of the biggest costs resulting from overwarning is the reduction in warning eectiveness resulting from
consumer confusion. In order to be eective, a warning must be both unambiguous and easily understood;
two goals which are often in conict.55 Raising the complexity of a warning scheme reduces ambiguity, but
such benets are soon outweighed by reductions in comprehensibility. The confusion generated when the
complexity of a warning scheme exceeds consumer comprehension most often manifests itself in an inability
to prioritize among warnings. Unable to direct substantial attention to every warning, and without sucient
information to gauge which are most important, the consumer is reduced to a course of almost random
conduct devoid of safety gains. In fact, overwarning may divert a consumer's attention from other important
product information { most notably, directions for use { leading to an overall decline in consumer safety.56
Even consumers who are more adept at sifting information, and are thus less likely to be overwhelmed by
the sheer volume of warnings, may not experience safety gains. Many simply trade one form of confusion for
another, avoiding information overload by unconsciously selecting bits and pieces of the available risk data,
but consequently basing their subsequent decisions on only a fraction of the relevant facts.57
There are a number of ways in which the consumer confusion resulting from the over-specialized labeling of
contact lenses could endanger consumer safety and health. The rst and most obvious eect of this variety
of overwarning is distortion of consumer choices. An individual whose doctor recommends the use of lenses
on an extended wear basis, for example, might choose to forego the use of contact lenses all together based
55See Victor Schwartz and Russell Driver, Warnings in the Workplace. The Need for a Synthesis of Law and Communication
Theory, 52 CINCINNATI L REV. 38, 61 (1983) (the manner in which the information in a product warning is expressed is as
important as the information itself, and includes considerations of clarity and comprehensibility).
56See Lars Noah, The Imperative to Warn: Disentangling the 'Right to Know' from the \Need to Know" About Consumer
Product Hazards, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 293, 384 (1994) (\One quite serious possibility is that overwarning will distract
consumers from attending to the directions for proper use, thereby increasing the chance of injuries resulting from product
misuse.").
57See Jason Pezner, Grading the Report Card: Lessons from Cognitive Psychology, Marketing, and the Law of Information
Disclosure for Quality Assessment in Healthcare Reform, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 207,2238-39 (1995) ([C]onsumers may uncon-
sciously avoid overload by selectively accessing subsets of presented information. As a result, choices are based on a fraction of
the signicant data.").
17on the fact that the lenses labeled specically for extended wear are beyond his means. Denied critical infor-
mation by the overwarning scheme { such as the fact that cheaper lenses labeled for some other specialized
use are, in fact, identical -the individual may resort to a less appropriate solution to his visual problems,
such as eye glasses, or may even leave the problem uncorrected. Similarly, an individual concerned by the
expense of rewetting drops could decide to use them too infrequently, unaware that another product he has
probably also purchased { rinsing solution { may perform the same function. The consequences of this mis-
directed action, however, are more severe, and could actually include damage to the eyes. These dangers can
only be magnied by the transmission of the disputed labeling practices to other contexts, where the dollar
dierentials may be greater and the health eects more severe. The FDA would thus be wise to consider
not only the danger its inaction presents to contact lens wearers, but the to the class of drug and medical
device users as a whole.
The danger of consumer confusion, however, is not the only hazard of overwarning. The danger of warning
dilution is equally great. Presented with a sea of warnings in every conceivable form, the typical consumer
may come to doubt their seriousness. In order for a warning to accomplish its purpose { that is, to promote
compliance { it must rst grab the viewer's attention. Because attention is a quantity which the average
consumer has in only a limited supply, warnings must be selective in order to be eective.58 As selectivity
decreases, the consumer is confronted with a barrage of risk information that no longer seems to accurately
depict the relative hazardousness of the consumer's lifestyle. The consumer's ability to discriminate between
warnings is thereby compromised, and signicant risks are dismissed as readily as those which are super-
uous.59 Excessive warnings are thus not only ineective in and of themselves, but actually decrease the
58See Twerski et al., supra note 54, at 514 ( Warnings \must call the consumer's attention to a danger that has a real
probability of occurring and whose impact will be signicant. One must warn with discrimination since the consumer is being
asked to discriminate and to react accordingly.").
59See Schwartz and Driver, supra note 55, at 60 (\when warnings become commonplace, they lose their most important
characteristic { the ability to focus the user's attention on a real and immediate danger."). See also Noah, supra note 56, at
381 (\There is a danger that the addition of warning statements to labeling may distract consumer's attention from existing
warnings about more serious risks as well as other important information.").
18eectiveness of prior warnings. After a certain threshold is passed, consumers begin to ignore the majority
of risk information, and actually make poorer decisions.60
In order to determine whether the over-specialized labeling of contact lenses constitutes the type of warning
which contributes to dilution, it is rst necessary to determine whether the labeling practices communicate
the presence of a substantial risk. A careful examination, however, reveals that any risk the disputed labeling
practices do convey is wholly illusory. This species of warning thus moves a step beyond even the highly
controversial warnings for saccharin and ozone depleting substances, which many deemed too insubstantial to
merit mention.61 While these warnings were criticized for diverting consumer attention from more important
concerns,62 they at least address risks which are real, however insignicant. Wearing contact lenses labeled
for daily wear on an extended wear basis, in contrast, presents no risk whatsoever. The lenses themselves
are equally appropriate for either use, with any risk entirely dependent on the particular visual impairment
of the wearer. The danger of warning dilution resulting from these labeling practices is thus twofold. The
rst is that lens wearers, and the users of other drugs and devices as these practices spread, will come to
regard excessive warnings not only as exaggerations, but as complete fabrications. Such an eect can only
reduce compliance rates. The second, and more serious, is that consumers will come to regard the product
identity itself { that is, the brand name and corresponding directions { as simply another warning to be
disregarded. If, starting with contact lenses, consumers can no longer believe that the product name on the
package accurately describes the identity of the product within, then all labeling requirements are reduced
to the functional equivalent of a uniform plain brown wrapper.
60See Pezner, supra note 57, at 238 (\Consumers provided with too much information disregard most of it and therefore
make objectively poorer decisions."). See also James Bettman et al., Cognitive Considerations in Designing Eective Labels
for Presenting Risk Information, 5 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 1, 7 (1986) (primary concern in creating warning labels is
to provide sucient information for informed chokes without overwhelming consumers); Debra Scammon, \Information Load"
and Consumers, 4 J. CONSUMER RES. 148, 148-55 (1977) (increased information load adversely aects consumer recall).
61See Noah, supra note 56, at 382 (\[C]ongressional warning requirements for tobacco products and alcoholic beverages
generally adhere to this policy of alerting consumers only to substantial risks, but statutory labeling requirements for saccharin
and ozone depleting substances are somewhat more suspect in this regard.").
62See id.
19Not all consumers, however, will react to the increasing number and variety of warnings by tuning them out.
Although overwarning may act as a kind of vaccination, increasing the resistance of certain consumers to
risk information, others will remain highly susceptible. Unfortunately, alarming these warning-sensitive con-
sumers can have an equally negative impact on overall warning eectiveness. Rather than reducing dangers
to consumer health, the most extreme forms of excessive warning can be added to the list of those dangers.
These warnings can lead to a constant state of heightened consumer anxiety, the stress of which can result
in serious physical and psychological ins.63 Consumer health can also be compromised by the inappropriate
investments of time and resources which excessive warnings spur. Rather than focusing on only signicant
risks, there is a real danger that consumers will overinvest in a distorted conception of safety.64 There is
also a danger that consumers will curtail or halt the use of relatively safe products.65 Such decisions are not
costless, and could result in health risks from inappropriate or reduced treatment which far outweigh those
associated with continued product usage.
The consumer alarm, like the consumer confusion, generated by overwarning in the contact lens context is
most likely to manifest itself in consumer decisions to forego the use of contact lenses. Whether a consumer's
determination that a particular variety of contact lenses is beyond his resources is based on confusion re-
garding the over-specialized labeling, or the conclusion that such labeling is a legitimate safety precaution,
the result is the same. While this cost may at rst glance seem minimal, such a judgment rests on the
assumption that contact lenses are used exclusively for cosmetic purposes. A person who engages is sports,
work, or other activities which involve rapid head movements, however, may nd eye glasses impractical.
63See Howard Beales, Benets and Costs of Label Information Programs, in PRODUCT LABELING AND HEALTH RISKS:
BANBURY REPORT 6, at 243,258-59 (Louis A. Morris et al. eds., 1980) (the secondary eects of excessive warning include
\health-threatening stress").
64See Henderson and Twerski, supra note 54, at 296 (\[T]he few persons who might continue to take warnings seriously
in an environment crowded with warnings of remote risks would probably overreact, investing too heavily in their versions of
'safety."'). See also Franklin and Mais, Tort Law and Mass Immunization Programs: Lessons from the Polio and Flu Episodes,
65 CALIF. L REV. 754, 759, 774 (1977).
65See Noah, supra note 56, at 387 (noting that agencies should take the health hazards associated with discouraging use of
safe products into account when imposing warning requirements).
20Permitting labeling to alarm such people to the point that they choose to forego corrective lenses subjects
not only the individuals themselves, but those around them, to greater risk of injury. But these risks pale
in comparison to those resulting from the misallocation of resources. By denition, each consumer who
overpays for lenses or lens solution as a result of these labeling practices { which, as mentioned previously,
currently includes at least 65% of lens purchasers { is overinvesting in a distorted conception of safety. This
overinvestment is almost certainly accompanied by an underinvestment somewhere else in each consumer's
personal healthcare budget; an underinvestment which can only expand as these labeling practices spread
to other contexts.
2. Impact on Professional Credibility
Focusing on the content of a warning as the sole determinant of its eectiveness, however, amounts to
addressing only half of the issue. The source of the warning is an equally important factor.66 Even the most
carefully crafted and reasonable warning, if issued from a source that is not particularly knowledgeable or
that is compromised by a conict of interest, will elicit only sparse compliance. The most critical attribute
of the source of the warning is thus its credibility.67 A source, like an individual, must develop this attribute
over time. Through a history of interaction with consumers, the source slowly endeavors to inuence their
mental apparatus in a manner which will allow the warning process to function eectively.68 Overwarning {
especially overwarning of a conspicuous nature { impedes this consumer-source exchange by equipping the
consumer's mental apparatus with skepticism and doubt Rather than alerting the public to risks, warnings of
66See Schwartz and Driver, supra note 55, at 59, 62 (asserting that both the content and the sender of a warning message
must be credible in order to induce compliant behavior).
67See id. at 63 (\[T]he eectiveness of a product warning will depend, in part, on the credibility of its source."). See
also A. SCHNEIDER ET AL., ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION 93-96 (1975) (describing the manner in which the
eectiveness of communication is inuenced by the sources credibility).
68See Twerski et al., supra note 54, at 515 (\The warning process, in order to have impact, will have to select carefully the
items which are to become part of the consumer's mental apparatus.").
21this nature place the credibility of the source in doubt, and generate public cynicism regarding the prospect
of warning labels in general.69 Actions with regard to only a few products, by damaging source credibility,
can thus put an entire warning regime in jeopardy.
With credibility established as the paramount requirement of a warning's source, there are two possible
sources which are immediately eliminated. The rst of these is drug and device manufacturers. In addition
to their obvious self interest { which establishes that their warnings will be motivated by the desire to
maximize sales and minimize liability, rather than by the desire to protect consumers { manufacturers are
disqualied for several other reasons. The rst of these is their myopic focus. A manufacturer's knowledge of
risk is often limited to those hazards which are associated with its own products, and may be incomplete in
even that respect.70 Manufacturer knowledge regarding the impact of warnings is similarly limited. While
manufacturers are capable of anticipating the eects of warnings on their own customers, they cannot foresee
the manner in which these warnings will impact the overall regime created by the multitude of warnings in
the marketplace.71 Finally, manufacturers possess very limited and specialized powers of communications.
Although they must be able to communicate with consumers to sell their wares, business complexities dictate
that the distance between manufacturer and consumer can be great, such that manufacturers may not be in
the best position to inuence all users of their products.72
Although lacking the type of self interest which characterizes manufacturers, courts also suer from a lack of
credibility which disqualies them as an ecient source of warnings. Perhaps the most signicant reason for
this lack of credibility has been the courts' historical inability to recognize the costs associated with excessive
69See Noah, supra note 56, at 383 (\[P]roliferation of hazard statements could drown out other more important information
on product labels and foster public cynicism about warning statements generally.").
70See Schwartz and Driver, supra note 55, at 62 (\Many manufacturers... may be able to predict neither the end-use of their
products nor the risks associated with that use.").
71See id. (\The manufacturer will not always be in the best position to design and distribute a product warning."). See also
D. BERLO, THE PROCESS OF COMMUNICATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THEORY AND PRACTICE 45-49 (1960)
(describing the information necessary to design product warnings and emphasizing the need for contextual information).
72See Schwartz and Driver, supra note 55, at 63 (\A manufacturer separated from those who use its product by a distribution
system it does not control will have limited ability to anticipate and meet the informational and motivational needs of the
product user.")
22warning. Although many courts have minimized these costs in their opinions, a decision of the Maryland
Court of Appeals { Moran v. Faberg e, Inc.73 { remains the most notorious. There the majority stated that:
[T]he cost of giving an adequate warning is usually so minimal amounting only to the expense of
adding some more printing to a label, that this balancing process will almost always weigh in favor
of an obligation to warn of latent dangers.74
This cavalier attitude regarding the vast array of costs associated with excessive warning is exacerbated by
the other shortcomings of the courts as a source of risk information. Like manufacturers, for instance, the
goal of courts in establishing warning requirements is not necessarily consumer safety. Instead, their primary
motivation is often the desire to establish dear standards for liability in order to determine compensation for
injuries which have already occurred.75 The fact that many warning requirements are elaborated in product
liability cases provides an additional impediment. The attention of the court in such instances must be
focused on a single risk, to the exclusion of all others, resulting in a tendency to exaggerate the magnitude of
that risk.76 Warning requirements produced in this manner are thus distorted, and reect only those risks
which have been the subject of litigation.77
Consumers are consequently left with only two credible sources of warning information in the medical device
context: the FDA and prescribing physicians. Because of its role in enforcing the FDCA, the FDA has the
broadest knowledge of the drug and device eld of any consumer protection organization. It has also estab-
lished its credibility by exercising restraint, avoiding the tendency toward over-regulation which has plagued
other agencies.78 Engaging in overwarning, even if through approval of the ill-considered labeling practices
73332 A.2d 11 (Md. 1975).
75See Schwartz and Driver, supra note 55, at 60 (\Courts that have preferred quantity of information over quality of commu-
nication not only allow, but also encourage, manufacturers to design legalistic warnings intended more to escape liability than
to prevent accidents.")
76See id. at 60 n.108 (\Products liability cases tend to focus on the particular hazard that caused the plaintis injury, not
the full array of possible hazards.").
77See id. at 60-61 n.108 (noting that court mandated warnings appear comprehensive only because they are the result of
hundreds of narrowly focused suits).
78See Hutt, supra note 2, at 113 ([T]he FDA has succeeded in exerting sucient regulatory control to protect public health,
23of contact lens manufacturers rather than through its own regulation, places this longstanding credibility in
danger. Although knowledge of these practices is not yet widespread, they have recently received attention
from several major publications and television news programs.79 News coverage of continuing consumer
fraud litigation will also serve to raise public awareness, as well as to highlight the FDA's lack of action.
Consumers who discover that the FDA has sanctioned the labeling which prompted their vast overpayment
for lenses as a new means of preventing product misuse will take subsequent warnings with a grain of salt.
While a warning regime which requires excessive reading will induce skepticism, a regime which requires
hard earned cash could induce skepticism of an all together dierent order. An agency which allows one to
be bilked in the name of safety, after all, is not likely to be regarded as a trusted protector.
The FDA's failure to take action also impinges on the credibility of prescribing physicians. Although doctors
themselves are unable to take corrective action against lens manufacturers, and may in fact be misled by
the disputed labeling practices to the same degree as their patients,80 they are nonetheless likely to be held
responsible by angry consumers. This result ows from the nature of the doctor-patient relationship; the
foundation of doctors' credibility as a warning source. The very strength of this bond of trust, generated
by the kind of close association that an administrative agency cannot imitate,81 will fuel a correspondingly
strong reaction when the patient feels this trust has been abused. A consumer's realization that he paid over
twenty times too much for his contact lenses, while his doctor said nothing, will almost certainly create that
feeling. However unwarranted these sentiments might be, they have already taken root, manifesting them-
selves in exhortations like these from a Denver newspaper: \Don't be a patient, be a consumer.... Quiz your
while at the same time avoiding over-regulation that would discourage medical device innovation and harm public health.").
But see STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY
COMMERCE, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., REPORT ON MEDICAL DEVICE REGULATION: THE FDA'S NEGLECTED CHILD
(Comm. Print 98-F 1983); Adler, The 1976 Medical De vice Amendments: A Step in the Right Direction Needs Another Step
in the Right Direction, 43 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 511 (1988).
79See infra notes 3-19 and accompanying text.
80See Noah, supra note 56, at 382-383 (noting that the excessive use of warning labels may lead to the confusion of physicians
as well as consumers).
81See Schwartz and Driver, supra note 55, at 63 (noting the superior credibility of physicians with users of prescription drugs).
24examiner about how strictly you must follow recommended wearing schedules, and ask whether a cheaper
lens will do for you."82 Such advice goes beyond consumer education, and advocates a defensive posture
with healthcare professionals that erases the distinction between patient and consumer. This distinction
has bolstered compliance with physician issued warnings for decades. It would be truly irresponsible for the
FDA to passively submit to its abolishment.
V. Conclusion
The FDA's refusal to take action to halt the over-specialized labeling of contact lenses and lens solution is
inconsistent with current interpretations of the FDCA and the long term policy interests of the agency. Not
only do these labeling practices clearly implicate the FDCA's misbranding provisions, but their continuing
use compounds the problem of overwarning, leading to an overall decline in warning eectiveness. While
current consumer fraud litigation against lens manufacturers could provide temporary relief for lens wearers,
it cannot provide the type of comprehensive solution the problem requires. Over-specialized labeling has
been an economic boon for certain lens manufacturers, and while the lack of competitor protest has been
surprising, there is no reason to believe that others in the drug and device industry have not taken notice.
The FDA would thus be wise to adopt a general policy regarding these practices before the ood of over-
specialized labels hits the marketplace. It is always best to act preventatively in the area of consumer health
and safety, and the time for prevention is now.
82Lesley Alderman, Shopping Around for Contact Lenses Can Be an Eye-Opening Experience, DENVER POST, Sept.
18,1994, at H-12.
25